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1 Introduction
A long-lasting micro/macro-economic question of interest deals with the dy-
namic relationship between growth and distribution. There is, in particular,
a specific branch of the micro-oriented literature, known as ‘pro-poor growth’,
that is generating continuous attention both scientifically and policy-wise, with
the main objective of assessing the extent to which poverty changes over time
because of growth. A number of different analytical tools have been developed
in the associated pro-poor growth literature for that purpose (see, inter alia,
Ravallion and Chen, 2003, Son, 2004, Essama-Nssah, 2005, Essama-Nssah and Lambert,
2009, Duclos, 2009).
A common feature of these tools is that the identity of the growth beneficia-
ries is irrelevant in the analysis; that is, the analytical tools satisfy an ‘anonymity’
property. Anonymity is a standard property for the measurement of poverty and
inequality, requiring that distributive measures be invariant to a permutation of
individual income vectors. This is an often uncontroversial assumption and is
in particular perfectly agreeable if the aim is to understand the purely cross-
sectional effect of growth. Postulating anonymity implies that income dynamics
are then ignored, namely that the mobility experience taking place because of
growth is not of normative and measurement interest.
To see this, consider the following two separate transformations A and B,
from one time period to another, undergone by a distribution of income of four
individuals:
(4, 6, 9, 9)→
A
(9, 9, 4, 6), (1)
(4, 6, 9, 9)→
B
(4, 6, 9, 9), (2)
and assume that the poverty line is fixed to 7 in both periods. A common proce-
dure to evaluate the pro-poorness of such income transformations is to compute
the Rate of Pro-Poor Growth (RPPG, Ravallion and Chen, 2003), which would
be equal to 0 for transformation A as the final marginal distribution of income
is strictly identical to the initial marginal distribution. This would be true for
all other measures of pro-poorness that can be expressed as functions of poverty
in each single period of time.1 The RPPG would also be equal to 0 for the
transformation B. The income dynamics otherwise implied by A and B are,
however, quite different: A leads to considerable mobility whereas B does not
1See for instance the indices proposed by Kakwani and Pernia (2000) and Kakwani and Son
(2003).
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and we may therefore wish their degree of pro-poorness to differ.
Because of this, recent contributions have argued that pro-poor and welfare
judgments of the effect of growth should be based on a ‘non-anonymous’ per-
spective (see notably Grimm, 2007, Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2011, Bourguignon,
2011, Palmisano and Van de gaer, 2013, Palmisano and Peragine, 2014). Propo-
nents of this emphasize the role played by mobility in the distributional effects
of growth. While both the measurement of growth pro-poorness and the mea-
surement of mobility are quite developed (see for instance Fields and Ok, 1999,
Fields, 2008, Ja¨ntti and Jenkins, 2015, for significant reviews), the analysis of
the impact of mobility on growth pro-poorness is yet to be developed to our
knowledge.
To distinguish the analysis of intertemporal pro-poorness from the standard
analysis of pro-poor growth, we first consider the individual poverty trajectories
over time. Second, consistent with Friedman (1962), we let growth pro-poorness
be sensitive to the equalization effect of mobility on the distribution of permanent
incomes. Third, we also let growth pro-poorness depend on the variability cost
introduced by mobility, since time variability may reduce welfare if individuals
are risk averse.
Whether growth is pro-poor is then determined by comparing observed in-
tertemporal poverty with a benchmark consisting of the absence of any kind of
distributional change. A natural benchmark for this is the poverty experienced
in the first period replicated over the other periods.
Our measurement framework draws from Bibi, Duclos, and Araar (2014),
who measure the welfare implication of mobility accounting for the cost of in-
equality across time and across individuals. However, their contribution is silent
on the impact of growth and mobility on poverty (see also Gottschalk and Spolaore,
2002, Creedy and Wilhelm, 2002, Makdissi and Wodon, 2003).
This paper further explores various pro-poorness features of growth through a
set of three additive decompositions. The first decomposition separates the mea-
surement of anonymous growth from that of non-anonymous growth. The second
decomposition isolates the unitemporal effects of income changes from multitem-
poral ones. The third decomposition separates the contribution of changes in
inequality, reranking and pure growth in explaining the pro-poorness of growth.
Note that this paper’s approach is both methodologically and conceptually
different from previous contributions on the topic. For instance, Grimm (2007)
introduces an Individual Rate of Pro-Poor Growth (IRPPG) which, being equiv-
alent to the average income growth of the initially poor individuals divided by
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the proportion of those individuals in the population, specifically focuses on the
impact of growth on the initially poor and ignores the negative income effects
of those who experience deprivation after growth. Foster and Rothbaum (2012)
use cutoff-based mobility measures to explain variations of poverty over time.
However, their method only applies to two specific indices measuring snapshot
poverty, namely the headcount ratio and the average poverty gap.
The contribution of this paper is thus twofold. The first is to account for the
impact of an income transformation on intertemporal poverty and, in so doing,
to disentangle the impact of anonymous growth from the impact of mobility (or
non-anonymous growth). The second contribution is to extend the “mobility as
equalizer” framework to take into account the impact of mobility on poverty,
corrected for the cost of poverty transiency as well as the cost of inequality in
the distribution of intertemporal poverty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the con-
ceptual framework. Section 3 proposes indices of intertemporal pro-poorness.
Section 4 presents a set of decompositions of the proposed indices. An empirical
illustration of this framework is contained in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 General measurement of pro-poorness in an intertem-
poral setting
Assume that we are interested in the dynamics of a distribution of living
standards (incomes, for short) and ill-fare of n ∈ N individuals, with individuals
denoted i = 1, ..., n over T fixed time periods (annual or monthly for instance)
of their life and with each generic period denoted by t = 1, ..., T . We assume T
to be common to all individuals, viz, we are comparing people’s lives over the
same number of time periods.
We assume periodic income yi,t to be drawn from the set of non-negative real
numbers R+. Let y(i) := (yi,1, . . . , yi,t, ..., yi,T ) then be the vector of individual
i’s incomes across the T periods and yt be a cross-sectional vector of incomes
at time t. The income profile yi is the ith row of the n × T matrix Y ∈ Ωn,T ,
where Ωn,T is the set of all n × T matrices whose entries are non-negative real
numbers. We assume that incomes have been normalized by the poverty line —
which could be absolute (constant in real terms) or relative (to income norms
that vary across time). Let then y˜i,t := min (yi,t, 1) be the periodic income
censored at the poverty line. Over an individual’s lifetime, poverty is measured
by p
(
y(i)
)
with p
(
y(i)
) ≥ 0 whenever ∃t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that yi,t < 1 and
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p
(
y(i)
)
= 0 otherwise. Total intertemporal poverty is measured by the index
P (Y ).
In the traditional context of snapshot poverty analyses, testing the pro-
poorness of a growth process implies comparing the observed final poverty level
with the one observed under some given benchmark; such a benchmark could be
either a desirable final level of poverty or a counterfactual one; denote it by Yˆ .
Our own measurement of pro-poor growth is anchored in the intertemporal
pro-poorness evaluation function, IPP
(
P (Yˆ ), P (Y )
)
, where P (Yˆ ) is benchmark
poverty. This evaluation function is assumed to satisfy a set of standard prop-
erties.2 They are, ∀Y ,Y ′, Yˆ , Yˆ ′ ∈ Ωn,T :
• Normalization: P (Yˆ) = P (Y)⇒ IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) = 0;
• Pro-poor : P (Yˆ ) > P (Y )⇒ IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) > 0;
• Anti-poor : P (Yˆ ) < P (Y )⇒ IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) < 0;
• More pro-poor :
– P (Y ) < P (Y ′) ≤ P (Yˆ )⇒ IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) > IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y ′));
– P (Yˆ ) > P (Yˆ ′) ≥ P (Y )⇒ IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) > IPP(P (Yˆ ′), P (Y ));
• More anti-poor :
– P (Y ) > P (Y ′) ≥ P (Yˆ )⇒ IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) < IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y ′));
– P (Yˆ ) < P (Yˆ ′) ≤ P (Y )⇒ IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) < IPP(P (Yˆ ′), P (Y )).
In words, we require that the measure of pro-poor growth be increasing in
P (Y ), decreasing in P (Yˆ ), and equal to zero if there is no difference between
poverty in the actual and in the benchmark distributions. A broad class of mea-
sures would be consistent with these requirements. For expositional simplicity,
we take the simple linear form
IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) := P (Yˆ )− P (Y ), (3)
which obeys all of the properties mentioned above.
We must also set a distributive benchmark. Different benchmark distribu-
tions will naturally lead to different evaluations of pro-poorness. The choice
depends mainly on whether a relative or an absolute approach is taken to eval-
uate pro-poorness — the former approach stating that growth is pro-poor when
2Similar properties are used for instance in Fields (2010) to define mobility.
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the incomes of the poor grow faster than some norm (often proportional to av-
erage or mean income) and the latter stating that growth is pro-poor when the
incomes of the poor are growing absolutely speaking. For expositional simplic-
ity, this paper follows an absolute approach, although generalizing to a relative
approach would just mean that incomes would need to be divided by the norm
(possibly by a simple adjustment of the poverty line).
Similarly, we must also agree on a concept of mobility. ‘Mobility means
different things to different people,’ in the words of Fields (2008, p. 1), because
both growth rates and the distribution of gains affect poverty over time. We
interpret mobility as any temporal change in individual income. The benchmark
is thus the absence of distributional changes. The benchmark is therefore a
counterfactual income distribution Y1 ∈ Ωn,T in which every person’s income is
the same as that person’s income in the first period.3
The index IPP(P (Yˆ ), P (Y )) in (3) is then the difference between poverty in
a counterfactual situation in which poverty in the first period is extended over
the T -period horizon and observed intertemporal poverty.4
3 A family of intertemporal pro-poorness indices
3.1 Individual ill-fare
Let the (normalized) poverty gap be given by gi,t := 1−y˜i,t, g(i) := (gi,1, . . . , gi,t, ..., gi,T )
be the corresponding vector of normalized poverty gaps for individual i across
T periods, and G be the corresponding n × T matrix of normalized poverty
gaps for the whole population. Also, let the distribution of gaps at time t
be given by the vector gt := (g1,t, . . . , gn,t). The gap gi,t is a standard mea-
sure of individual poverty in the literature for both snapshot and intertemporal
poverty measurement. It is, for instance, at the base of the well-known FGT
class (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) of additive poverty indices as well as
of its intertemporal generalizations in Foster (2009), Canto, Grad´ın, and del Rio
(2012) or Busetta and Mendola (2012), not to mention specific members of the
family of indices introduced by Hoy and Zheng (2011), Bossert, Chakravarty, and d’Ambrosio
(2012) and Dutta, Roope, and Zank (2013). Using the FGT formulation, the
3This is consistent with the approach used in Chakravarty, Dutta, and Weymark (1985)
and Fields (2010), although the benchmark in Chakravarty et al. (1985) is based on relative
immobility, i.e. the share of each individual in total income is assumed to remain stable across
time.
4This property is called normalization in Hoy and Zheng (2011), requiring that if an indi-
vidual gets every period the same income level, then his lifetime poverty can be represented by
snapshot poverty.
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poverty of each individual i over the T periods can be measured by:
pβ
(
y(i), z
)
:=
T∑
t=1
ωtg
β
i,t with β ≥ 0, (4)
where ωt is a weighting function that captures the sensitivity of poverty to the
specific period in which deprivation is experienced and with
∑T
t=1 ωt = 1. If ωt >
ωt+1 more importance is given to poverty experienced earlier in life, for instance
in childhood; if ωt < ωt+1 more importance is given to poverty experienced later
in life.5
The parameter β is a measure of aversion to inequality and variability in the
poverty gaps. Higher levels of β give higher weights to a loss of income when
income is already low than when it is large. For β = 1, (4) corresponds to the
simple weighted average of i’s poverty gaps across time. For β > 1, a sequence
of income increments and decrements that keep the weighted mean of the gaps
unchanged but reduces their intertemporal variability decreases pβ
(
y(i), z
)
. (4)
is a measure of “union” poverty since individuals are regarded as intertemporally
poor whenever they are deprived during at least one time period.
In order to account explicitly for the cost of time variability, we use the
poverty counterpart of the ‘equally distributed equivalent income’ introduced
in Atkinson (1970) for the measurement of social welfare and inequality. The
equally distributed equivalent (EDE) poverty gap for individual i, piβ
(
g(i)
)
, is
given by:
piβ
(
g(i)
)
:= p−1β
(
pβ
(
y(i), z
))
=
(
T∑
t=1
ωtg
β
i,t
) 1
β
. (5)
The EDE gap piβ
(
g(i)
)
is the value of the gap that, if experienced at each
period of i’s lifetime, would yield i the same level of poverty over time as that
generated by g(i). For β = 1, piβ
(
g(i)
)
equals the simple weighted average gap
over time, that is pi1
(
g(i)
)
=
∑T
t=1 ωtgi,t. For β ≥ 1, piβ
(
g(i)
)
is never lower
than pi1
(
g(i)
)
because of aversion to poverty variability. The difference can be
interpreted as the cost of poverty variability for individual i:
cβ(g(i)) := piβ
(
g(i)
)− pi1 (g(i)) . (6)
5(4) is a specific version of the lifetime individual poverty measure introduced by
Hoy and Zheng (2011). See also Bresson and Duclos (2015).
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Consequently, intertemporal poverty for i can be expressed as:
piβ
(
g(i)
)
= cβ(g(i)) + pi1
(
g(i)
)
(7)
Hence, piβ
(
g(i)
)
is (weighted) average intertemporal poverty plus the intertem-
poral cost of mobility.
3.2 Social ill-fare
The FGT formulation is also used to aggregate individual poverty:6
Pα,β (Y , z) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
piβ
(
g(i)
))α
, (8)
where α ≥ 0 is a parameter of aversion to poverty inequality across individuals.
The EDE in the population, Πα,β (G), is given by:
Πα,β (G) :=
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
piβ
(
g(i)
))α) 1α
. (9)
We can also define anonymous intertemporal poverty as Πα = Πα,α. Switching
the income of two poor individuals at a given period t will then leave the social
evaluation of intertemporal poverty unchanged, whatever the income levels of
the two individuals in the other periods.7
Although the indices Pα,β and Πα,β are ordinally equivalent and so can be
used indifferently for comparing any pair of distributions, Πα,β (G) can be use-
fully interpreted as the level of poverty which, if assigned equally to all indi-
viduals and across all time periods, would produce the same poverty level as
that generated by the intertemporal distribution G. It thus can be seen as an
intertemporal generalization of the class of ethical poverty indices introduced
by Chakravarty (1983) for snapshot monetary poverty. Since the index aggre-
gates individuals’ intertemporal poverty, it also incorporates early/late poverty
sensitivity with weights wt and parameter β.
6This corresponds to the index P θα proposed by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) in the
context of multidimensional poverty measurement. It is different from Duclos, Araar, and Giles
(2010), where α = β and ωt =
1
T
∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
7This can be more easily seen if we express Πα (G) as:
Πα (G) =
(
T∑
t=1
ωt
1
n
n∑
i=1
gαi,t
) 1
α
=
(
T∑
t=1
ωtPα(gt)
) 1
α
. (10)
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Figure 1: Inter-individual inequality vs intertemporal variability.
b r
br
g(b)
g(a) g˜(b)
g˜(a)
0 ga,1,
g˜b,2, ga,2
gb,1,
g˜a,2, gb,2
g˜a,1 g˜b,1
gi,11
gi,2
1
Figure 1 helps understand the trade-off between inequality reduction and
income variability and its implications for pro-poor evaluation. It shows the
poverty gap of two individuals, i = a, b, over a two-period lifetime horizon, t =
1, 2, in two different polar cases. For the sake of clarity, we assume that ω1 = ω2.
In the first case with the circular dots, the two individuals experience identical
poverty each period, that is, ga,1 = ga,2 = piβ(g(a)) and gb,1 = gb,2 = piβ(g(b)),
but there is inequality of poverty between them. Thus Πα,β (G) = Πα (g1). The
second case with the square dots is the reverse one: g˜a,1 = g˜b,2 6= g˜b,1 = g˜a,2, and
piβ
(
g˜(a)
)
= piβ
(
g˜(b)
)
= Πα,β
(
G˜
)
, namely, the two individuals are identical but
experience different levels of poverty at different time periods.
The poverty ranking of these two income distributions will depend on the
social aversion towards poverty variability and poverty inequality. Note that
the distribution of periodic incomes is the same under the two processes. With
the same degree of aversion towards variability and inequality (i.e. α = β), the
two distributions are judged poverty equivalent. This happens because, in the
first case there are neither costs nor benefits generated by mobility, whereas, in
the second case, the benefits of intertemporal poverty equalization are canceled
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out by the costs of variability. Indifference towards variability, β = 1, makes G˜
better than G. Indifference towards inequality (α = 1) makes G better than G˜.
Hence, whether G has more poverty than G˜ will depend on the values of α and
β.
For the sake of illustration, consider the example (1) seen in the introduction.
The sign of IPPα,β will depend on the value assigned to the parameter of aversion
to poverty variability and aversion to intertemporal poverty, whatever the choice
of the weights. Let us consider the case of ω1 = ω2. With greater weight
to variability aversion (assume β = 3 and α = 2), the index is negative (e.g.
IPP2,3 = −0.027), implying that the transformation is not pro-poor because of
the cost of temporal variability. With α = 3 and β = 2, the index is positive
(e.g. IPP3,2 = 0.029) and the transformation is pro-poor because of the effect
of poverty equalization.
Let
cα,β (G) := Πα,β (G)−Π1,β (G) (11)
be the cost of inequality of intertemporal poverty across individuals. This is
different from:
1
n
n∑
i=1
cβ(g(i)) = Π1,β (G)−Π1,1 (G) , (12)
which is the average cost of poverty variability in the population. Substituting
(12) into (11) and solving for Πα,β (G) we find:
Πα,β(G) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
cβ(g(i)) + cα,β (G) + Π1,1 (G) . (13)
Equation (13) expresses total intertemporal poverty as the sum of three com-
ponents: the cost of poverty variability, the cost of inequality in intertemporal
poverty and the average individual intertemporal poverty gap in the population.
With the benchmark deprivation matrix G1, that is the deprivation matrix
corresponding to Y1, we have Πα,β (G1) = Πα (g1) with:
Πα (g1) =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
gαi,1
) 1
α
, (14)
which is initial cross-sectional poverty. The cost of inequality between individuals
is the cost of inequality experienced in the initial period, that is, cα (g1).
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The benchmark level of poverty can then be expressed as:
Πα (g1) = cα (g1) + Π1 (g1) . (15)
which is the cost of inequality in the distribution of individual poverty gaps in
the first period plus the average poverty gap in the first period.
3.3 Intertemporal pro-poorness indices
Using the poverty indices introduced previously, (3) can be expressed as:
IPPα,β = Πα (g1)−Πα,β (G) . (16)
The index equals 0 when growth leads everyone’s deprivation unchanged. It is
positive if intertemporal poverty is less than first-period poverty, and negative in
the opposite case. If growth eliminates poverty at the subsequent periods, then
IPPα,β will be equal to (1− ω1)Πα (g1) > 0.
IPPα,β incorporates the cost of temporal variability and the benefits of a
possible reduction of inequality in individual poverty, both due to the effects
of mobility. IPPα,β obeys the usual social evaluation properties of population
invariance, anonymity (in the identity of first-period incomes), scale invariance,
continuity, and subgroup consistency. IPPα,β is naturally increasing in the initial
level of aggregate poverty and decreasing in the level of aggregate intertemporal
poverty. The effects of a change in first-period gaps is ambiguous as it affects
both benchmark and intertemporal poverty.
Figure 2 illustrates the computation of IPPα,β in a two-person two-period
case with loss aversion (ω2 > ω1) and primacy of aversion to inequality over
aversion to variability (α > β). The joint distribution of income gaps is shown
by the two red circular dots g(a) and g(b). One observes that the poorest indi-
vidual (namely b) has benefited from a dramatic improvement in his situation
with the opposite happening to the initially less poor person (a). The compu-
tation of piβ(g(a)) and piβ(g(b)) can be seen by projecting on one axis the points
at which the iso-poverty curves for each poverty profile across the diagonal of
perfect immobility (the small blue circles). Aggregation across the population
yields the EDE gap (the larger blue circle) Πα,β(G). For the benchmark situ-
ation, we first generate the benchmark profiles (the smaller violet squares) by
vertical projection of the observed profiles on the diagonal of perfect immobility.
Aggregation across individuals leads to Πα(g1) (the large violet squares). The
difference between Πα(g1) and Πα,β(G) is here positive, indicating that growth
10
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Figure 2: The intertemporal pro-poorness of a two-period growth/mobility pro-
cess.
b
g(a)
r
ga,1
bC
b
g(b)
r
gb,1
bC
bC
r
0 gi,11IPP > 0
gi,2
1
piβ(g(a))
Πα,β(G)
Πα(g1)
piβ(g(b))
Note: The iso-poverty contours correspond to the case of β = 2, ω1 =
1
3
, and
ω2 =
2
3
. For social aggregation, α is set equal to 3.
has been pro-poor from an intertemporal perspective.
4 Decompositions
We now provide three decompositions of the IPPα,β index. For expositional
simplicity, we set T = 2.8 The generic poverty measure Πα,β (G) will be denoted
by Πα,β (g1, g2) and benchmark poverty, Πα(g1), by Πα(g1, g1).
The first decomposition distinguishes between the anonymous and the mo-
bility components of growth. This is given by:
IPPα,β = Πα (g1, g1)−Πα (g1, g2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AG
+Πα (g1, g2)−Πα,β (g1, g2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
(17)
Recall that Πα (g1, g2) is anonymous intertemporal poverty and does not account
for the benefits or the costs of mobility. AG therefore captures the poverty effect
8See the appendix for a generalization to larger values of T .
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of anonymous growth, while M captures the effect of mobility.
Considering again the example given by (1), we have AG = 0 andM = 0.029
with α = 3 and β = 2. Since the anonymous growth impact is nil, the growth
effect on intertemporal poverty is entirely attributable to a (pro-poor) mobility
effect.
M will be positive when aversion towards inequality is stronger than aversion
towards temporal variability, α > β, and otherwise negative. The sign of the
effect is not determined by the weights (ω1, ω2). If β = α, then M = 0. β = 1
and α = 1 lead to neutrality to variability and inequality and to M ≥ 0 and
M ≤ 0, respectively.
Figure 3: Decomposing two-period intertemporal pro-poorness: growth and mo-
bility
b
g(a)
r
bC
b
g(b)
r
bC
bC
r
q
q
q
0
IPP
AG
M
gi,11
gi,2
1
Πα,β(G)
Πα(G)
Πα(g1)
Note: The iso-poverty contours correspond to the case of β = 2, ω1 =
1
3
and
ω2 =
2
3
. For social aggregation, α is set equal to 3.
Figure 3 illustrates this decomposition using the case shown in Figure 2. The
difference between the benchmark (the larger violet square) and anonymous
intertemporal poverty (the larger green pentagon) is positive, indicating that
the AG component is positive. The effect of mobility is shown by the difference
12
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between anonymous intertemporal poverty (the larger green pentagon) and the
actual level of intertemporal poverty (the larger blue circle). Mobility exerts here
a less important (but still positive) effect than the anonymous growth effect.
The second decomposition distinguishes further between standard anony-
mous pro-poorness and this paper’s intertemporal approach. In a two-period
setting, we can rewrite equation (13) as:
Πα,β (g1, g2) = ω1P1(g1) + ω2P1(g2) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
cβ(g(i)) + cα,β (g1, g2) , (18)
which leads to the decomposition:
IPPα,β = ω2 [P1 (g1)− P1 (g2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆P c
+ ω2 [cα (g1)− cα (g2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆cc
+ [ω1cα(g1) + ω2cα(g2)]− cα,β(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mc
− 1
n
n∑
i=1
cβ(g(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
CV
(19)
∆P c reflects changes in the average periodic gaps, P1 (g1) and P1 (g2). ∆P c
is neutral with respect to variability and inequality. ∆cc is, up to a multiplicative
term, the difference between the cost of inequality in the initial and in the final
periods. ∆cc can be both positive or negative, depending on whether inequality
in cross-sectional poverty has fallen or has increased between the two periods.
Leaving aside the weight ω2, together ∆P c and ∆cc capture the usual measure
of anonymous pro-poor growth in the spirit of Ravallion and Chen (2003).9 The
third component, M c, is the difference between the weighted sum of the cost
of unitemporal inequalities and the cost of intertemporal inequality, which is
mobility’s ability to decrease inequality between individuals, taking the cost of
variability into account. The fourth component, CV , captures the cost of the
variability generated by mobility. CV is always positive when β > 1: variability
aversion always assigns a cost to the variability induced by mobility. Taken
together, the two components M c and CV capture the trade-off between the
benefits and the costs of mobility, the intertemporal pro-poorness effects. Note
that ∆cc = 0 and M c = 0 with α = 1, and CV = 0 when β = 1. In the limiting
9AG and the sum ∆P c +∆cc differ in general, since we have
AG =
(
Pα(g1)
) 1
α − (ω1Pα(g1) + ω2Pα(g2)) 1α , (20)
∆P c +∆cc = ω2
((
Pα(g1)
) 1
α − (Pα(g2)) 1α ) . (21)
Note that AG = ∆P c +∆cc when α = 1; when α > 1, we have instead AG ≤ ∆P c +∆cc.
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case of α = β = 1, ∆cc = M cα,β = CV = 0, and thus IPPα,β = ∆P
c, the
difference in the average poverty gap.
Consider again our first example. The first two components, ∆P c and ∆cc,
are equal to 0 since the (anonymous) temporal distribution of income is the
same in both periods. For α = 3, β = 2, M c = 0.089 is positive meaning that
growth reduces inequality form an intertemporal perspective; inequality is the
same in both periods, but enlarging the time-horizon to two periods, inequality
is decreased with respect to the benchmark case. Lastly, CV = 0.059, which is
mobility’s variability cost.
The third and last decomposition also considers the reranking effect of growth.
Denote by gI1 a counterfactual distribution of poverty gaps in the first period that
has the first period’s mean gap, the second period’s inequality and individuals
arranged in the same order as in the first period.10 Also denote by gIR1 the distri-
bution of poverty gaps in the second period scaled to have the mean poverty gap
of the first period.11 Note that the counterfactual distributions gI1 and g
IR
1 are
constructed by considering the inequality and ranking of the distribution of the
poverty gaps and not the distribution of income. Although this procedure may
seem questionable, it is in line with sensitivity to inequality of poverty across
time (through β) and to inequality of intertemporal poverty across individuals
(through α).
Observing that Πα(g1) = Πα,β (g1, g1), the third decomposition is then:12
IPPα,β =
[
Πα,β (g1, g1)−Πα,β
(
g1, g
I
1
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
[
Πα,β
(
g1, g
I
1
)−Πα,β (g1, gIR1 )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
+
[
Πα,β
(
g1, g
IR
1
)−Πα,β (g1, g2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
PG
. (22)
It has three components. The first component I measures the intertemporal
effects of inequality and variability in poverty (g1 and gI1 have the same mean and
the same ranking of individuals). I captures the effects of inequality across time
and inequality across individuals through maintaining temporal ranks constant.
An increase in inequality will always result in I being negative, no matter the
10In the case of example (1) in the introduction, given the distribution of poverty gap in the
initial period and final period g1 = (0.43, 0.14, 0, 0) and g2 = (0, 0, 0.43, 0.14), g
I
1 is given by
(g3,2, g4,2, g1,2, g2,2)× P1(g1)P1(g2) = (0.43, 0.14, 0, 0)×
0.285
0.285
.
11In the case of example (1), gIR1 = (g1,2, g2,2, g3,2, g4,2)× P1(g1)P1(g2) = (0, 0, 0.43, 0.14)×
0.285
0.285
.
12 See Ruiz-Castillo (2004) for a similar decomposition of the CDW (the Chakravarty et al.
(1985)) ethical index of mobility.
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combination of the values of the parameters. With α = β = 1, given neutrality
to intertemporal variability and inequality in poverty, I will be null.
The second component, R, captures the poverty effect of reranking (gIR1 and
gI1 have same mean and same cross-sectional inequality, but differ in the ranking
of individuals). R = 0 if there is no-reranking. When reranking occurs, the sign
of R will depend on the values of the parameters. For α < β, R < 0 because
reranking generates time variability and the variability costs are deemed larger
than the inequality benefits of reranking individuals. Alternatively, R > 0 for
α > β, since reranking helps equalizing poverty over time and the equalization
benefits are higher that the variability costs. α = β = 1 implies R = 0.
The third component PG captures a pure growth effect on poverty (g2 is gIR1
scaled to the mean of g2). It will be positive (negative) if there is a reduction
in individuals’ intertemporal poverty due to pure growth. The sign of PG does
not depend on the values of α and β, though the higher is β with respect to
α, the higher tends to be the (negative or positive) value of the impact. When
α = β = 1, IPPα,β = PG: pro-poorness is determined by the pure growth effect.
Note that AG is not purged from the effect of inequality (and reranking) while
PG is.13
With the example in (1), I = 0 given that inequality is identical in both
periods; R = −0.03 for α = 2, β = 3, since there is a reshuﬄing of individuals
in the distributions (the two initially poor individuals become the two richest),
but the variability costs are higher than the benefits; and PG = 0 given that
the average gap is unchanged.
This decomposition is sketched in Figure 4 using the scenario of the ear-
lier Figure 3. In this situation, the inequality component I is supporting pro-
poorness as indicated by the difference between the benchmark (the larger violet
square) and the counterfactual profile (g1,gI1) (the larger orange diamond-shaped
dots). The difference between the latter and the counterfactual scenario (g1,gIR1 )
(the larger blue triangle) shows that reranking also supports pro-poorness, al-
though to a lower extent than inequality. Finally, the impact of pure growth
on pro-poorness is given by the difference between poverty in the counterfactual
scenario (g1,gIR1 ) (the larger blue triangle) and observed intertemporal poverty
13Note that this decomposition is path-dependent. The value of the components would be
different with different ‘paths’ for the decomposition. For instance, one might have wanted
to capture first the growth effect, then the reranking effect and finally the inequality one.
No path is necessarily more correct than another (see, e.g. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux,
1996). A possible procedure would be to apply a Shapley-Shorrocks decomposition, consisting
of computing the Shapley-value of each effect across all possible paths of the decomposition
(see Shorrocks, 2013).
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Figure 4: Decomposing two-period intertemporal pro-poorness: inequality,
reranking and growth
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(the larger blue circle); PG also supports pro-poorness.
5 Empirical illustration
5.1 Data
This Section provides an empirical application of the tools developed above
using the panel component of the Eurostat ‘European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions’ (EU-SILC). The EU-SILC, which started in 2005, is a
representative survey of the resident population within each European country,
interviewed every year. For the present paper we consider the 2006, 2007, 2008,
and 2009 waves. Note that this time interval includes the period in which the
economic crisis started in Europe, and this may help assess whether EU countries
have performed differently in terms of pro-poorness.
The unit of observation used in the analysis is the individual. The measure
of living standards is household disposable income, which includes all house-
16
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hold members earnings, transfers, pensions, and capital incomes, net of taxes on
wealth and incomes and of social insurance contributions. Incomes are expressed
in Euros at PPP exchange rates and in constant 2005 prices and adjusted for
differences in household size using the square root of the household size. The
countries considered are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus
(CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Denmark (DK), Finland
(FI), France (FR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithua-
nia (LT),Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal
(PT), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), and United Kingdom (UK). We perform the
illustration using country-specific poverty lines fixed to 60% of their 2006 median
income.
5.2 Results
We first start by evaluating the pro-poorness of the income transformation
process that took place between 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 for the 23 European
countries listed above. The assessment of intertemporal pro-poorness depends on
the choice of the weights as well as on aversions to variability and to inequality
of intertemporal poverty. Here, we choose to weight equally poverty in all the
four periods. For α and β, we fix α = 2, which is the most common value used
in the literature, and let β be equal to 1, 2, 3 and infinity. The numerical values
of our estimates of intertemporal pro-poorness, for all combinations of the value
of α and β considered in this paper and for all the 23 European countries, are
reported in Table 1. A graphical representation is available in Figure 5, where
countries are ordered according to the average value of the four IPPα,β , namely
IPP2,1, IPP2,2, IPP2,3, IPP2,∞.
Some striking results stand out from Table 1 and Figure 5.
First, the value of IPPα,β is positive for all countries when α = 2 and β = 1,
meaning that the benefits of equalization matter for pro-poorness judgments.
IPPα,β is also always positive when α = 2 and β = 2, although lower than it
is in the previous case, implying that, when we start to introduce variability
concerns by increasing the value of β, pro-poorness declines. When α = 2 and
β = 3, that is, when more importance is given to the costs of mobility than
to its benefits, our index is again positive for all countries, with the exception
of Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Spain. The costs generated by variability
matter for pro-poorness judgments: as β increases, the index of pro-poorness of
each country and the degree to which it changes is not the same across countries,
meaning that variability affects each country’s pro-poorness differently. As ex-
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Table 1: Intertemporal pro-poorness indices IPPα,β for 23 European countries,
2006–09.
Country (α = 2, β = 1) (α = 2, β = 2) (α = 2, β = 3) (α = 2, β =∞)
AT 0.038 0.013 -0.0016 -0.050
BE 0.072 0.042 0.025 -0.032
BG 0.053 0.022 0.0049 -0.055
CY 0.041 0.028 0.020 -0.013
CZ 0.034 0.018 0.0078 -0.027
DK 0.031 0.00067 -0.016 -0.066
EE 0.057 0.030 0.015 -0.040
ES 0.068 0.019 -0.0097 -0.100
FI 0.032 0.013 0.0021 -0.034
FR 0.058 0.030 0.013 -0.041
HU 0.077 0.043 0.023 -0.039
IS 0.088 0.052 0.033 -0.025
IT 0.050 0.020 0.0012 -0.067
LT 0.058 0.034 0.019 -0.039
LV 0.086 0.051 0.030 -0.044
MT 0.052 0.021 0.003 -0.052
NL 0.045 0.018 0.0031 -0.046
NO 0.065 0.037 0.021 -0.037
PL 0.073 0.043 0.026 -0.030
PT 0.049 0.027 0.013 -0.039
SE 0.032 0.012 -0.001 -0.043
SI 0.028 0.018 0.011 -0.017
UK 0.065 0.026 0.004 -0.070
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC.
pected, IPP2,∞ is always negative, because in this extreme case all that matters
is the cost of mobility, and the effect of growth is judged by how much it wors-
ens poverty between the initial period and the period in which each individual
experiences the highest poverty.
Second, the distribution of intertemporal pro-poorness among countries is
quite dispersed, showing that they have performed quite differently in the early
phase of the crisis.
Third, the country rankings depend on the normative importance given either
to inequality or to variability, that is, as we change the value of β. For example,
for IPP2,1 the best performing is Island, while the worst is Slovenia; for IPP2,2,
Island is again top ranked, while at the bottom we find Denmark; for IPP2,3
Poland is the most pro-poor and Spain is the least; last, for IPP2,∞ Cyprus is
18
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Figure 5: IPPα,β , α = 2, for different β and for 23 European countries, 2006–09,
ordered by the average value of the IPPα,β .
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top ranked, while Spain is again bottom ranked.
A last interesting feature to notice is that, within each country, the four
indices behave very differently. The country that shows less variability among
the four IPPα,β is Slovenia, which has a median rank in our sample. Alterna-
tively, when β = 1, Spain is ranked among the best performing countries, while
when β = 3 it ranks the worst. This again confirms that accounting for both
the benefits and costs of mobility can be important for growth pro-poorness
judgments.
We proceed by performing the three types of decompositions introduced
above, each of them emphasizing a distinct aspect of growth pro-poorness.
For expositional simplicity, we focus on two cases: (i) α = 2, β = 1; and (ii)
α = 2, β = 3.
The estimates of the elements of the first anonymous/non-anonymous de-
composition are reported in Table 2, where countries are sorted alphabetically.
A more synthetic representation of the results is shown in Figure 6.
Table 2 shows clearly that distinguishing between anonymous and non-anonymous
growth can matter. Note first that there is always a considerable amount of vari-
ability, which reduces the degree of pro-poorness of the 2006-09 growth process
(shown by the β = 3 columns). Hence, a pure anonymous evaluation would
overestimate the pro-poorness of the growth episode for all the countries consid-
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Table 2: First decomposition: anonymous (AG) and non-anonymous (M) pro-
poorness of growth for 23 European countries, 2006–09.
Country (α = 2, β = 1) (α = 2, β = 3)
IPP AG M IPP M
AT 0.038 0.013 0.025 -0.0016 -0.015
BE 0.072 0.042 0.030 0.025 -0.017
BG 0.053 0.022 0.031 0.0049 -0.017
CY 0.041 0.028 0.012 0.020 -0.0081
CZ 0.034 0.018 0.017 0.0078 -0.0099
DK 0.031 0.00067 0.030 -0.016 -0.016
EE 0.057 0.030 0.027 0.015 -0.015
ES 0.068 0.019 0.049 -0.0097 -0.028
FI 0.032 0.013 0.019 0.0021 -0.011
FR 0.058 0.030 0.029 0.013 -0.017
HU 0.077 0.043 0.034 0.023 -0.019
IS 0.088 0.052 0.036 0.033 -0.019
IT 0.050 0.020 0.030 0.0012 -0.018
LT 0.058 0.034 0.024 0.019 -0.015
LV 0.086 0.051 0.035 0.030 -0.021
MT 0.052 0.021 0.031 0.003 -0.018
NL 0.045 0.018 0.027 0.0031 -0.015
NO 0.065 0.037 0.028 0.021 -0.016
PL 0.073 0.043 0.030 0.026 -0.017
PT 0.049 0.027 0.022 0.013 -0.014
SE 0.032 0.012 0.020 -0.001 -0.013
SI 0.028 0.018 0.011 0.011 -0.0067
UK 0.065 0.026 0.039 0.004 -0.022
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC. The AG component for IPP2,3 is
not reported because it is identical to the AG for IPP2,1.
ered. The negative impact of variability is sometimes strong enough to revert
the sign of the measure of anonymous pro-poorness of growth. For instance,
AG with α = 2 is never negative, but IPP2,3, is negative for four out of the
23 countries. For these countries, therefore, the variability and cost of mobility
exceed the intertemporal inequality reduction and growth benefits of the income
transformation.
The inequality reduction effect of mobility can also be sizable, Figure 6 shows
that the benefits of inequality reduction affect pro-poorness more strongly than
the costs of time variability. With inequality aversion higher than variability
aversion (α = 2, β = 1), AG and M are strongly correlated, which also says that
the greater the growth impact, the greater the expected intertemporal inequality
benefit. In the opposite situation (α = 2, β = 3), the correlation is negative but
weaker in absolute value; the greater the impact of growth, the greater also its
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Figure 6: First decomposition, anonymous (AG) and non-anonymous (M) for
23 European countries, 2006–09.
(a) α = 2, β = 1.
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variability cost.
Figure 7 orders countries by decreasing values of IPPα,β . With α = 2 and
β = 1, it is clear that both anonymous growth and the mobility benefits of
intertemporal equalization affect intertemporal pro-poorness. The shares of AG
and M in total IPP2,1 vary considerably across countries. Denmark (DK) is
perhaps the most extreme case since intertemporal pro-poorness is explained
entirely by intertemporal inequality reduction benefits.
The panel on the right of Figure 7 (α = 2, β = 3) shows again that the
variability cost of mobility can exceed the growth effects. However, losses of pro-
poorness due to variability are generally lower in absolute value than the gains
of pro-poorness seen in the panel on the left. Moreover, the costs of mobility are
usually more pronounced when anonymous growth pro-poorness is strong.
In both panels, the ranking of countries by AG is very different from that by
IPP . Mobility, through variability and intertemporal inequality effects, therefore
change considerably the assessment of growth pro-poorness.
The results of the second decomposition are reported in Table 3. Countries
are ordered as in Table 2. Both the cross-sectional average poverty gaps ∆P c
and the costs of cross-sectional inequality ∆cc fall in all countries, with the
exception of Denmark for which the costs of cross-sectional inequality increase.
The difference between unitemporal and intertemporal costs is always positive
when α > β and is still positive for 6 countries when α < β. This says that the
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Figure 7: First decomposition for 23 European countries, 2006–09, ranked by
IPPα,β , anonymous (AG) and non-anonymous (M)
(a) α = 2, β = 1.
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unitemporal and intertemporal costs of inequality differ, with mobility impacting
more the latter. The last component, CV , which captures the cost of variability,
can be strong enough to dominate the three others (this happens in Portugal,
Bulgaria, UK, Italy, and Denmark) change the sign of IPP (as for Austria,
Denmark, Spain, and Sweden) and affect significantly the ranking of countries.
This is also seen in Figure 8. The panel on the left shows that the contribu-
tion of the variation in the cross sectional costs of inequality (∆cc) and of the
intertemporal cost effect (M c) can be large, with the average poverty gap ef-
fect (∆P c) weaker, though always positive. The costs of variability are nil since
neutrality to variability is assumed.
On the right-hand panel, IPP2,3 is mostly determined by the variation in the
cross-sectional costs of inequality and by the variation in cross-sectional poverty,
both almost always positive. The intertemporal inequality cost component is
almost always negative and strong.
The results of the third decomposition (inequality change I, reranking R,
and pure growth PG) are reported in Table 4. Countries are ordered as in
Table 2. The magnitude and the sign of the components vary considerably
across countries. This can be more easily seen on Figure 9, where countries are
ordered as on Figure 8. For each country, the first component (I) is marked on
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Table 3: Second decomposition: average poverty gap (∆P c), cross-sectional
inequality (∆cc), difference between intertemporal and unitemporal inequality
(M c), and variability (CV ) components for 23 European countries, 2006–09.
Country (α = 2, β = 1) (α = 2, β = 3)
∆P c ∆cc M c CV ∆P c ∆cc M c CV
AT 0.0058 0.0082 0.024 0 0.0058 0.0082 -0.0011 0.015
BE 0.021 0.025 0.026 0 0.021 0.025 -0.0023 0.019
BG 0.016 0.011 0.027 0 0.016 0.011 -0.0023 0.019
CY 0.013 0.018 0.0093 0 0.013 0.018 -0.0025 0.0088
CZ 0.0088 0.0098 0.016 0 0.0088 0.0098 -0.0015 0.0093
DK 0.0042 -0.0032 0.03 0 0.0042 -0.0032 -0.002 0.015
EE 0.017 0.016 0.024 0 0.017 0.016 -0.0014 0.016
ES 0.015 0.005 0.049 0 0.015 0.005 0.0096 0.039
FI 0.007 0.0064 0.019 0 0.007 0.0064 -0.002 0.0093
FR 0.014 0.018 0.026 0 0.014 0.018 -0.0028 0.017
HU 0.017 0.031 0.028 0 0.017 0.031 -0.0054 0.02
IS 0.015 0.046 0.027 0 0.015 0.046 -0.013 0.015
IT 0.013 0.0074 0.029 0 0.013 0.0074 0.0044 0.024
LT 0.022 0.013 0.022 0 0.022 0.013 0.0031 0.02
LV 0.036 0.019 0.031 0 0.036 0.019 0.004 0.029
MT 0.0076 0.016 0.028 0 0.0076 0.016 -0.0059 0.015
NL 0.008 0.013 0.024 0 0.008 0.013 -0.0053 0.012
NO 0.012 0.03 0.023 0 0.012 0.03 -0.0059 0.015
PL 0.023 0.028 0.022 0 0.023 0.028 -0.0052 0.019
PT 0.013 0.015 0.021 0 0.013 0.015 0.0016 0.016
SE 0.0049 0.0076 0.02 0 0.0049 0.0076 -0.0042 0.0093
SI 0.0073 0.012 0.0091 0 0.0073 0.012 -0.0013 0.0068
UK 0.013 0.015 0.038 0 0.013 0.015 0.0068 0.03
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC. Recall that IPPα,β can be
obtained as a function of the components listed in the Table, see equation (22).
the horizontal line by a square, the second (R) by a dot, the third (PG) by a
triangle.
From the left-hand panel in which α = 2 and β = 1, we note that I is strong
and negative and that its distribution differs considerably from PG: the higher
is PG, the lower is I. On the contrary, the PG and R components are always
positive and correlated; together they are able to offset the effect of I. Therefore,
intertemporal pro-poorness is positive for all countries.
The panel on the right (with α = 2 and β = 3) increases the dispersion
of the components across the countries. As expected, given the increase in
variability aversion, I falls but keeps a similar trend across the countries. PG
further increases and shows a similar trend across the countries; it also diverges
from I, dominates all the other components, and loses its correlation with R.
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Figure 8: Second decomposition: average poverty gap (∆P c), cross-sectional
inequality (∆cc), difference between intertemporal and unitemporal inequality
(M c), and variability (CV ) components for 23 European countries, 2006–09..
(a) α = 2, β = 1.
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Pro-poorness is then generally determined by the interactions of the three com-
ponents, not by any one of them alone.
6 Conclusion
When is growth pro-poor? This paper argues that a comprehensive assess-
ment of pro-poorness may require a shift from a purely cross-sectional perspective
to a longitudinal one, thus accounting for individual poverty dynamics over time.
To this end, the paper proposes a family of aggregate indices of intertem-
poral pro-poorness. Differently from previous studies that compare the initial
and final distributions of income, this paper’s approach uses the additional in-
formation provided by the complete multiperiod joint distribution of income.
The proposed indices aggregate equally-distributed-equivalent measures of the
temporal poverty experienced by each individual in a society. The indices cap-
ture both the cost of variability and the benefit of intertemporal equalization
induced by mobility. Three procedures show the effect of pure growth, cross-
sectional inequality, intertemporal inequality, reranking and temporal variability
in explaining growth pro-poorness.
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Table 4: Third decomposition: inequality change (I), reranking (R), and pure
growth (PG) for 23 European countries, 2006–09.
Country (α = 2, β = 1) (α = 2, β = 3)
I R PG I R PG
AT -0.013 0.031 0.02 -0.016 -0.018 0.033
BE -0.044 0.048 0.068 -0.058 -0.026 0.11
BG -0.062 0.042 0.072 -0.11 -0.024 0.14
CY -0.029 0.015 0.054 -0.039 -0.0097 0.068
CZ -0.035 0.024 0.045 -0.054 -0.012 0.074
DK -0.023 0.035 0.019 -0.031 -0.018 0.034
EE -0.056 0.039 0.074 -0.08 -0.021 0.12
ES -0.034 0.062 0.04 -0.04 -0.035 0.065
FI -0.035 0.026 0.04 -0.042 -0.013 0.057
FR -0.055 0.046 0.068 -0.086 -0.023 0.12
HU -0.053 0.054 0.075 -0.095 -0.025 0.14
IS -0.085 0.056 0.12 -0.2 -0.02 0.26
IT -0.029 0.038 0.04 -0.033 -0.023 0.057
LT -0.073 0.03 0.1 -0.099 -0.017 0.14
LV -0.1 0.058 0.13 -0.14 -0.032 0.21
MT -0.025 0.041 0.037 -0.04 -0.022 0.065
NL -0.037 0.035 0.048 -0.057 -0.016 0.077
NO -0.03 0.033 0.061 -0.056 -0.018 0.093
PL -0.084 0.047 0.11 -0.16 -0.022 0.21
PT -0.024 0.027 0.046 -0.03 -0.016 0.06
SE -0.027 0.024 0.036 -0.035 -0.015 0.049
SI -0.018 0.012 0.034 -0.023 -0.0078 0.042
UK -0.017 0.05 0.031 -0.019 -0.028 0.051
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC.
An empirical illustration of the measurement framework for 23 European
countries is also provided. It shows that, unless we impose extreme aversion
to individual variability in income gaps, growth can be regarded as pro-poor
over the 2006–09 period in most European countries, in spite of the difficulties
that these countries faced during that period. The results further show that
the intertemporal pro-poorness features of the income transformations that took
place over 2006–09 vary considerably across European countries. They also vary
within each country, depending on the normative relevance given to variability
as opposed to inter-individual inequality. Thus, mobility, through variability
and intertemporal inequality effects, does change significantly one’s assessment
of growth pro-poorness. Consequently, assessments framed into an anonymous
or unitemporal perspective can provide an incomplete picture of the impact of
growth on poverty and may also result in the implementation of inefficient anti-
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Figure 9: Third decomposition for 23 European countries, 2006–09.
(a) α = 2, β = 1.
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(b) α = 2, β = 3.
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Note: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC.
poverty policies.
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Appendix
Generalization to T periods
As mentioned in the main text, the decompositions provided in this paper
can be generalized to time horizons of T > 2 periods.
The first decomposition is obtained by adding and subtracting in (16) the
EDE of periodic individual poverty as follows:
Πα (g1)−Πα (g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AG
+Πα (g)−Πα,β (g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
To generalize the second decomposition, observe that (13) can be rewritten
as:
Πα,β(g) = ω1P1(g1) + ω2P2(g2) + ...+ ωTPT (gT ) + cα,β(g) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
cβ((g))
IPPα,β can then be decomposed as :
ω2 [P1 (g1)− P1 (g2)] + ω3 [P1 (g1)− P1 (g3)] + ...+ ωT [P1 (g1)− P1 (gT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆P c
+
+ω2 [cα (g1)− cα (g2)] + ω3 [cα (g1)− cα (g3)] + ...+ ωT [cα (g1)− cα (gT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆cc
+[ω1cα(g1) + ω2cα(g2) + ω3cα(g3) + ...+ ωT cα(gT )]− cα,β(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mc
+
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
cβ(g(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
CV
Lastly, when T > 2, the third decomposition can be obtained as :
[
Πα,β (g1)−Πα,β
(
gI1
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
[
Πα,β
(
gI1
)−Πα,β (gIR1 )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
+
+
[
Πα,β
(
gIR1
)−Πα,β (g)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
PG
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Here, gI = (g1, ..., gIt , ..., g
I
T ), where g
I
t denotes the counterfactual distribution
of poverty gaps at time t obtained by preserving the same average poverty
gaps and ranks as observed in the first period distribution. Similarly, gIR =
(g1, ..., gIRt , ..., g
IR
T ), where g
IR
t denotes the counterfactual time-specific distri-
bution of poverty gaps obtained by keeping the same average poverty gap as
that of the first period distribution.
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